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THE  IRRELEVANCE OF TESTS  FOR  BIAS IN 
SERIES OF MACROECONOMIC  FORECASTS 
Roy H.  Webb 
Many  economists  have  recently  examined  time 
series  of  macroeconomic  forecasts  or  surveys  of 
expectations  for  statistical  bias.’  A  partial  listing 
of prominent  writings  includes  articles  by Brown  and 
Maital  [ 19811,  de  Leeuw  and  McKelvey  [ 19811, 
Figlewski  and  Wachtel  [ 19811,  Friedman  [ 19801, 
Gramlich  [ 19831,  Hafer  [ 19851,  Holden  and  Peel 
[  19851, Lakonishok  [  19801, McNees  [  19781, Pearce 
[ 19841,  Urich  and  Wachtel  [ 19841,  and  Zarnowitz 
(19851. 
The  standard  test  for  bias  in a series  of forecasts 
begins  by  estimating  coefficients  in  the  following 
equation: 
(1)  A,  =  (Y +  P  ,-,P,  +  et 
where  A, is the  actual  value  at time  t of the  variable 
predicted,  ,-,P,  is the  prediction  made  at time  t-l  for 
the  value  at time  t, a! and /3 are coefficients  estimated 
by  least  squares,  and  E, is  an  error  term  that  is 
assumed  to  be  from  a  series  of  independent  and 
identically  distributed  normal  random  variables  with 
zero  mean.  An  F-test  can  then  be  used  to  test  the 
joint  hypothesis  that  (Y =  0  and  fl  =  1.  If  that 
hypothesis  is rejected,  the  standard  interpretation  is 
that  the  series  of  forecasts  is biased. 
Most  of  the  authors  apparently  believe  that  by 
examining  the  statistical bias of those  time  series,  they 
are  testing  an  important  component  of  the  new 
classical  economics,  the  hypothesis  of  rational 
expectations.  As  Hafer  put  it,  “Because  [wealth- 
maximizing]  agents  presumably  will  not  make 
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r  An even  larger  literature  exists  in finance,  where  tests  for bias 
have  been  stimulated  by  the  efficient  markets  hypothesis. 
forecasts  that  are  continually  wrong  in  the  same 
direction,  rational  forecasts  should  be  statistically 
unbiased.“2 
The  assertion  that  bias  is  not  consistent  with 
rational  expectations  is examined  below.  First,  two 
meanings  of  the  term  rational  expectations  will  be 
presented.  Several  difficulties  with  interpreting  the 
test  for  bias  are  discussed  next;  several  limit  the 
relevance  of  the  test  for  the  more  important  defi- 
nition  of  rational  expectations.  Even  if that  test  is 
interpreted  as applying  to  the  less  important  defini- 
tion  (a technical  requirement  adopted  for  analytical 
convenience),  it is argued  that the  authors  cited  above 
have  failed  to consider  several  possible  explanations 
for  their  results  that  do  not  contradict  rational 
expectations.  It  is  concluded  that  tests  of  macro- 
economic  predictions  for  statistical  bias  have  not 
yielded  useful  information  about  the  rationality  of 
expectations. 
Rational Expectations 
The  term  rational  expectations  has become  wide- 
ly used;  different  authors,  however,  may  attach  dif- 
ferent  meanings  to  the  term.  This  paper  will focus 
on two  ideas,  one  that  is a general  principle  and  the 
other  a highly restricted  form  of the first. The  general 
principle  is that  the  actions  of optimizing  individuals 
lead  to  an absence  of rents  in equilibrium  (in other 
words,  profitable  opportunities  will be exploited).  An 
important  implication  is that  costly  information  will 
be  used  efficiently.  This  “informational  efficiency” 
idea is crucial  to economists  often  labeled  as rational- 
expectations  analysts.  The  restricted  form  of infor- 
mational  efficiency  that  is  often  used  is “certainty 
equivalence,”  which  implies  that  a  representative 
individual’s  optimally  predicted  value  of an economic 
magnitude  can  be  identified  with  the  mathematical 
expectation  of  a  specific  linear  function  that  cor- 
rectly  describes  the  operation  of the  economy.  The 
assumption  of certainty  equivalence  helps  economists 
2  Hafer,  page  3. 
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tractable;  as the  passages  below  indicate,  however, 
it  is  not  a  critical  idea  for  economists  who  have 
pioneered  the  use  of  rational  expectations. 
The  [rational  expectations]  hypothesis  asserts  three 
things:  (1)  Information  is  scarce,  and  the  economic 
system  generally  does  not  waste  it.  (2)  The  way  expec- 
tations  are  formed  depends  specifically  on  the  structure 
of  the  relevant  system  describing  the  economy.  (3)  A 
“public  prediction,”  in  the  sense  of  Grunberg  and 
Modigliani,  will  have  no  substantial  effect  on  the 
operation  of  the  economic  system  (unless  it  is  based 
on  inside  information).  .  .  .  For  putposes  of  ana&sis, 
we  s/ka//  use  a  speciak-ed  form  of  th  hypothesis.  In  par- 
ticular,  we  assume:  (1)  The  random  disturbances  are 
normally  distributed.  (2)  Certainty  equivalents  exist  for 
the  variables  to  be  predicted.  (3)  The  equations  of  the 
system,  including  the  expectations  formulation,  are 
linear.  Muth  119611, p.  348.  (Emphasis  added.) 
But  it  has  been  only  a  matter  of  analytical  convenience 
and  not  of  necessity  that  equilibrium  models  have  used 
.  .  . the  assumption  that  agents  have  already  learned  the 
probability  distributions  they  face.  [It] can  be  abandoned, 
albeit  at  a  cost  in  terms  of  the  simplicity  of  the  model. 
Lucas  and  Sargent  [1979],  p.  13. 
[The  rational  expectations]  approach  says  that  if  people 
do  not  observe  something  directly-such  as  the  current 
price  level-then  they  form  the  best  possible  estimate  of 
this  variable,  given  the  information  that  they  possess.  In 
other  words  people  make  efficient  use  of  their  limited 
data,  so  as  not  to  commit  avoidable  errors.  Barro  [1984], 
pp.  468-69. 
As Muth  noted,  the  strong  requirement  of certainty 
equivalence  was adopted  for analytical  convenience. 
Without  certainty  equivalence  it  is  not  necessary 
that  optimal  predictions  are  mathematical  expecta- 
tions.  Also,  note  that  the  authors  stress  that  indi- 
viduals  make  the  best  possible  use  of  information 
they  possess-not  that  individuals  have  perfect 
information. 
SEVEN  REASONS  WHY  OPTIMAL 
FORECASTS  CAN  SHOW  BIAS 
This  section  explains  why  a series  of predictions 
could  appear  biased  even  though  they  were  originally 
prepared  optimally.  Many  of the  explanations  have 
the  common  thread  of  asymmetric  information.  In 
some  cases,  the  ex  post  reviewer  uses  more  infor- 
mation  than  was actually  available to forecasters  when 
the  forecasts  were  made.  In  others,  the  process  of 
reviewing  forecasts  ignores  relevant  data  that  was 
available  to  forecasters.  Failure  to  properly  account 
for  either  of  those  informational  asymmetries  limits 
the  relevance  of tests  for bias.  The  first four  reasons 
below  question  the  relevance  of  tests  for  bias  as  a 
test  for  both  informational  efficiency  and  certainty 
equivalence;  the  last  three  only  apply  to  the  strict 
requirements  of  certainty  equivalence. 
1.  Unequal  Data  Availability:  Real-Time 
Forecasts versus Ex  Post Evaluation 
In  many  cases  economists  have  tested  for  biased 
predictions  by comparing  recorded  forecasts  with the 
latest  available  data.  The  data on which  the  forecasts 
were  based,  however,  have  often  been  revised 
substantially  by  the  agencies  that  compile  and report 
the  data.  In fact,  it is possible  that  the  ex  post  bias 
found  in  forecasts  could  be  due  to  the  reviewer 
having  access  to data  revisions  that  were  unavailable 
to  real-time  forecasters  (that  is,  those  who  actually 
issued  forecasts  before  the  fact).3 
Lupoletti  and Webb  [  19861 noted  that  preliminary 
data  on the  rate  of change  of the  GNP  implicit  price 
deflator  were  at one  time  biased  predictors  of the  final 
data released.  Since  most  findings  of biased  fore-casts 
or surveys  of expectations  refer  to the  inflation  rate, 
the  biased  original  inflation  data  could  explain  many 
biased forecasts  without  contradicting  their  rationality. 
To  see  whether  early  reports  of  the  percentage 
change  in  the  implicit  price  deflator  were  biased, 
consider: 
(2)  A,  =  a  +  @P,  +  et 
where  A, is  the  actual  value4  at  time  t  of  the  per- 
centage  change  in the  implicit  price  deflator  from ‘the 
previous  quarter,  P,  is  the  first  data  officially  re- 
leased  for  that  percentage  changes,  CY  and  fl  are 
3 It is implicitly  assumed  that  forecasters  attempt  to predict  the 
true value  that  is estimated  in official-reports,  and  that  successive 
revisions  are  usually  closer  to  the  true  value  than  initial  reports. 
The  first  assumption  may  not  always  be  valid;  consider  a bond 
trader  who  is concerned  about  market  changes  in the  first  few 
minutes  following  a preliminary  report. 
4 The  actual data are index  numbers,  based  on  1982 = 100. They 
reflect  all  revisions  through  early  1987. 
5 Approximately  fifteen  days  after  the  beginning  of  each 
calendar  quarter  (t + 1) the  Commerce  Department  released  its 
preliminary  estimate  of the  implicit  price  deflator  for the  previous 
quarter  (t). At that  time  a forecaster  would  also have  had  a value 
for  the  deflator  two  quarters  earlier  (t -  l),  which  would  have 
been  revised  twice  since  its  preliminary  release.  At  the  be- 
ginning  of  quarter  t + 1, therefore,  the  first  official  estimate  of 
the  change  in  the  deflator  between  quarter  t  and  quarter  t -  1 
becomes  available.  It  is  that  first  official  estimate  that  is  used 
as  the  early  series  P,  in  this  section. 
Due  to  the  benchmark  revision  of  1976,  which  changed  the 
base  year  of  the  index  from  1958  to  1972,  there  is  a  dis- 
continuity  in  late  1975  for  the  original  data.  To  adjust  for  the 
base  period  change,  data  before  the  revision  were  multiplied  by 
4  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  NOVEMBER/DECEMBER  1987 coefficients  estimated  by  least  squares,  and  et is an 
error  term  that  is assumed  to  be  from  a series  of in- 
dependent  and identically  distributed  normal  random 
variables  with  zero  mean.  If  the  preliminary  value 
P, is an unbiased  predictor  of the  latest  revised  value 
A,, then  the  estimate  of the  coefficient  CY  should  be 
0  and  the  estimate  of  fl  should  be  1. 
Table  I contains  regression  results  for equation  (2) 
over  the  1970s.  The  hypothesis  of  no  bias  is  de- 
cisively  rejected  by a conventional  F-test.  Forecasters 
in the  197Os,  therefore,  should  not  be  assumed  to 
have  had  unbiased  data  on  which  to  base  their 
forecasts,  given  the  subsequent  revisions  in the  im- 
plicit  deflator. 
The  implicit  deflator  is not  the  only  measure  of 
prices  that  has been  studied.  Leonard  and Solt  [  19863 
noted  that  the  consumer  price  index  diverged  from 
other  measures  of consumer  prices  before  1983  due 
to the  CPI’s treatment  of mortgage  interest  payments 
(which  has  been  criticized  by  many  analysts).  They 
found  that  survey  data which  other  authors  had found 
to  be  biased  were  unbiased  when  compared  against 
a better  estimate  of  consumer  prices. 
The  problem  of  biased  initial  data  that  is  later 
revised  is not  confined  to prices.  Mork  [ 19871 found 
that  early  releases  of  real  GNP  growth  from  1968 
through  1984  were  biased.  Since  it  is  widely  be- 
lieved  that  real  GNP  is the  best  single  statistic  for 
describing  the  economy’s  performance,  Mark’s 
finding  is  particularly  disturbing.  Certainly  many 
0.68187,  the  ratio  of  the  deflator  for  the  last  two  quarters  of 
1975 with  1972 = 100 to the  deflator  for those  two  quarters  with 
1958 = 100.  Visual  inspection  of  the  series,  before  and  after 
rebasing  the  earlier  data,  did  not  reveal  any  distortion.  Also, 
residuals  from  the  regression  reported  in Table  I were  not unusual 
in  late  1975. 
Table  I 
REGRESSION  RESULTS:  TESTS  FOR  BIAS 
IN  PRELIMINARY  DATA 
A,  =  2.95  +  0.67  P, 
(.65)  t.09) 
Time  span:  7O:l  to  79:4 
R2  =  .57 
DW  =  2.18 
F-statistic  (for  CY =  0  and  P  =  1)  =  11.9 
F. o,,z,m  =  5.26 
Notes:  A  is  the  actual  inflation  rate,  measured  with  latest  data. 
P  is  the  inflation  rate,  based  on  the  preliminary  data 
release. 
Standard  errors  are  in  parentheses. 
economists’  expectations  of other  variables  would  be 
affected  by  the  reported  growth  rate  of  real  GNP. 
Zarnowitz  [ 19821 has  not  only  found  evidence  of 
biased  initial  data  releases  for many  time  series,  but 
also found  “extraordinary  divergences”  among  various 
data  series  describing  real  economic  activity  in 
1973-74.  Since  most  studies  of forecasts  or  expec- 
tations  include  that  period,  confusion  at  that  time 
could  have  a strong  impact  on  the  results  of ex post 
studies. 
None  of  the  studies  cited  in  the  introduction 
attempt  to determine  the  extent  to which  their  results 
might  be  due  to  bias  in  the  data  available  to 
forecasters  at  the  time  forecasts  were  prepared. 
Pearce  (19841  and  Zarnowitz  [1985],  however,  do 
mention  the  problem  of data  available  to forecasters. 
2.  Difficulty of Improving Real-Time 
Forecasts 
It may  seem  that  a biased  series  of forecasts  would 
indicate  that  forecasters  did  ignore  an easy  method 
of  improving  forecasts:  simply  removing  that  bias. 
That,  at least,  is apparently  the  assumption  of most 
of  the  articles  cited. 
Now  suppose  that  a series  of forecasts  was found 
to  be  biased-that  is,  after  the  coefficients  in equa- 
tion  (1)  were  estimated,  the  joint  hypothesis  of 
(Y =  0 and  p  =  1 was rejected.  As Theil  [ 1966)  has 
noted,  a more  accurate  series  of forecasts  P’  could 
then  be  constructed  by  adjusting  the  series  P: 
(3)  P,’ =  &  +  BP, 
where  & and fi are estimates  of the  coefficients  (Y  and 
p  from  equation  (1).  For  example,  if the  predicted 
series  was  expressed  in  percentage  points  and  a 
forecaster  was on  average  one  percentage  point  too 
high  (& =  -l),  then  the  adjusted  forecast  would  sub- 
tract  one  percentage  point  from  that  forecaster’s 
prediction.  This  would  be  an almost  costless  way of 
improving  forecasts.  Failing  to use  it would  therefore 
seem  to  waste  information. 
The  flaw in that  argument  is that  it assumes  that 
the  coefficients  of  equation  (3)  were  known  to 
forecasters  at  the  time  of  forecast.  In  fact,  those 
coefficients  could  have  been  estimated  only  after  the 
forecasts  were  issued.  Now  if the  coefficients  were 
stable  over  time,  one  could  reasonably  impute  their 
knowledge  to a forecaster,  since  after  a few years  the 
forecaster  could  have  recognized  the  bias  and 
estimated  the  coefficients.  But if the  coefficients  were 
to  change  over  time,  then  using  historic  data  to 
estimate  them  would  not  necessarily  improve 
forecasts,  since  estimates  of (Y  and fi would  no longer 
be  relevant. 
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forecasts  has more  information  than  did the  forecaster 
when  the  forecasts  were  prepared.  Just  because 
using  some  of  the  additional  information  could  im- 
prove  forecasts  does  not  show that forecasters  ignored 
potentially  valuable  data. 
For  example,  Table  II contains  regression  results 
for  equation  (l),  using  quarterly  growth  rates  of the 
implicit  price  deflator  from  1970  to  1984  as  the 
actual  series  and  the  published  forecast  of Wharton 
Econometric  Forecasting  Associates  as the  forecast 
series.  An F-test  shows  statistical  bias; moreover,  the 
residuals  were  significantly  autocorrelated.  Could 
Wharton  have  produced  more  accurate  forecasts  by 
using  the  Theil  adjustment  mechanism  shown  by 
equation  (3)? 
To  answer  that  question,  the  first  25 observations 
were  used  to estimate  equation  (l),  and the  estimated 
coefficients  were  used  to  adjust  the  forecast  as  in 
equation  (3). Next,  one  observation  was added,  equa- 
tion  (1)  was  reestimated,  and  the  next  quarter’s 
forecast  was  adjusted.  That  process  was  repeated 
until  32  adjusted  forecasts  were  obtained.6  The 
adjusted  forecasts  had  a  slightly  larger  root  mean 
squared  error  (1 S6.5)  than  did Wharton’s  published 
series  (1 S38).  It therefore  appears  that  Wharton  did 
not  waste  the  information  from  their  past  forecast 
errors  even  though  a sample  of its historic  forecasts 
now  appear  biased. 
Wharton’s  inflation  forecasts  therefore  provide  a 
counterexample  to  the  idea  that  a  retrospective 
finding  of bias proves that  information  was  wasted.7 
Of course,  an author  might  still be  able  to  show  that 
other  information-that  was  available  to  Wharton 
when  its  forecasts  were  prepared-could  have  im- 
proved  its forecasts.  The  point  is, that  author  would 
have  to  specifically  identify  the  useful  information 
that  was wasted.  A simple  test  for bias does  not  iden 
6  Although  serially  correlated  residuals  were  apparent  in  the 
whole  data  range,  standard  tests  revealed  no  significant  serial 
correlation  in  the  partial  ranges  that  ended  before  1981.  The 
coefficients  in  the  earlier  ranges  were  therefore  estimated  by 
OLS.  When  serial  correlation  became  significant,  a first-order 
autoregressive  process  was  assumed  and-maximum  likelihood 
estimates  were  made  for the  coefficients  in (1) and  for rho.  The 
estimated  rho  value  was  then  also  used  to  adjust  the  Wharton 
forecasts. 
7 The  general  usefulness  of the  The&type  bias  correction  is an 
unresolved  issue.  It  is  possible  that  the  Wharton  counter- 
example  is  simply  a  small-sample  happenstance.  It  is  also 
possible  that  findings  of bias  themselves  are  often  small-sample 
happenstances  with  little predictive  value.  In any particular  case, 
actually  testing  the  bias  correction  method  gives  an  indication 
of  its  ability  to  improve  forecast  accuracy;  unfortunately,  such 
tests  are  rarely  performed. 
Table  II 
REGRESSION  RESULTS:  INFLATION  FORECASTS 
FROM  WHARTON  ECONOMETRICS 
A,  =  3.23  +  0.60  ,,P,  +  0.37  ut-, 
t.941  (. 14)  (. 13) 
Time  span:  7O:l  to  84:l 
R2  =  .52 
DW  =  2.01 
F-statistic  (for  a!  =  0  and  p  =  1)  =  6.29 
F.  -  5.04  01,2,54  - 
Notes:  A  is  the  actual  inflation  rate,  measured  with  latest  data. 
P  is  the  Wharton  Econometrics  forecast  for  the  inflation 
rate,  prepared  at  the  end  of  the  previous  quarter. 
Standard  errors  are  in  parentheses. 
tify that  information;  moreover,  any process  that iden- 
tified wasted  information  would  probably  make  a test 
for bias superfluous.  None  of the  authors  cited  in the 
introduction  specifically  identify  the  wasted  informa- 
tion  that  could  account  for  findings  of  bias. 
3.  Average  versus Marginal 
In  many  cases  it  is marginal  behavior  that  deter- 
mines  economic  outcomes.  Studies  of surveys  of ex- 
pectations,  however,  often  focus  on average  behavior. 
The  relevance  of  such  studies  was  questioned  by 
Mishkin  [1981,  p.295]: 
Not  all  market  participants  have  to  be  rational  in  order 
for  a  market  to  display  rational  expectations.  The  be- 
havior  of  a  market  is  not  necessarily  the  same  as  the 
behavior  of the  average  individual.  As  long  as unexploited 
profit  opportunities  are  eliminated  by  some  participants 
in  a  market  .  .  .  then  the  market  will  behave  as  though 
expectations  are  rational  despite  irrational  participants 
in  that  market. 
Mishkin  tested  the  same  survey  data  that  were 
found  to  be  inconsistent  with  rationality  by  Fried- 
man.  By focusing  on marginal  behavior,  he found  the 
data  to  be  consistent  with  rationality.  To  explain 
Friedman’s  results,  he  suggested  that  the  survey  data 
did  not  accurately  describe  actual  behavior  in  the 
bond  market. 
Other  studies  of expectations  also focus  on average 
behavior.  None  of the  authors  cited  in the  introduc- 
tion  who  study  surveys  of  expectations  examine 
whether  their  conclusions  would  change  if they  ex- 
amined  marginal  behavior. 
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Aggregates 
Although  most  economists  could  state  an opinion 
for the  future  time  path  of macroeconomic  variables, 
not  all would  be willing to bet  money  on their  predic- 
tions.  Equivalently,  it  is  a  trivial  matter  to  put  a 
number  on  a survey  form;  if an  important  decision 
were  to  be  based  on  the  data,  however,  careful  and 
thoughtful  analysis  would  probably  precede  any 
forecast. 
Surveys  of expectations  do not  necessarily  measure 
solid  analyses  or even  informed  opinions  that  affect 
real  decisions.  Instead,  it is quite  possible  that  they 
contain  relatively  uninformed  opinions  of  persons 
who  will not  make  important  decisions  based  on their 
expectations  and  accordingly  have  little  incentive  to 
acquire  costly  information.  The  relevance  of  any 
findings  of  bias  in  such  surveys  is  questionable. 
5.  Nonstationary  Data 
Suppose  that  a data  series  z  is generated  by  the 
following  random  walk: 
(4)  zt  =  z,+  +  e, 
where  e,  is from  a series  of  independent  and  iden- 
tically  distributed  normal  random  variables  with  zero 
mean.  The  mathematical  expectation  of  zt at  time 
t-l  is therefore  z,+.  But  a sample  of  such  forecasts 
could  be found  to be  statistically  biased  if the  coeffi- 
cients  of equation  (1) were  estimated,  assuming  that 
A,  =  zt  and  ,-,P,  =  zel.  That  is,  equation  (1)  is 
misspecified  if the  actual  data-generating  process  is 
given  by  (4)s.  Significance  tests  from  a misspecified 
equation  can  of  course  be  misleading. 
A Monte  Carlo  study  illustrates  that  point.  Equa- 
tion  (4) was used  to generate  101 observations  of z,, 
where  z1 =0  and  values  of e, were  randomly  drawn 
from  a normal  distribution  with  a zero  mean  and  a 
unit  variance.  Using  z,+  as the  forecast  for  zt,  since 
E,-l[z,]  =  zrTl, equation  (1)  was  estimated  and  an 
F-test  performed  for  bias.  The  procedure  was  then 
repeated  999  times,  thereby  testing  1000  random 
walks  of  100  observations  each  for  bias.  By  con- 
struction  there  was  no  bias;  yet  in  189  cases,  the 
8 To  see  why  equation  (1) would  be  misspecified,  note  that  it 
assumes  the  existence  of a fixed  constant  term,  which  is not  con- 
sistent  with  the  assumed  random  walk.  A random  walk can often 
drift  far  from  the  origin  without  ever  crossing  the  origin  in  a 
fixed  sample.  In that  case,  a regression  equation  such  as (1) will 
find  a significant  constant  term  and  slope  coefficient  different 
from  unity.  Those  findings,  however,  have  no  meaning  for  the 
future  behavior  of  the  random  walk. 
hypothesis  of no  bias  was  rejected  at the  5 percent 
level,  and  in an additional  139  cases  it was  rejected 
at the  10 percent  level.  That  is, investigators  would 
have  found  bias  in many  instances  due  to  the  inap- 
propriate  choice  of  a  test  statistic. 
Once  the  possibility  of  nonstationary  data  is 
recognized,  the  burden  of  proof  should  be  on  the 
author  to  demonstrate  that  F-tests  are  valid.9  For 
example,  Schwert  [ 19871 discusses  procedures  that 
could  be  used  to  test  time  series  for  stationarity.  In 
addition,  Nelson  and  Plosser  [1982]  and  Schwert 
have  presented  evidence  that  many  macroeconomic 
time  series  appear  to be empirically  indistinguishable 
from  random  walks.  Yet  none  of  the  authors  cited 
in the  introduction  test  for  stationarity  in the  actual 
data  series  employed.  That  is especially  troubling  for 
those  authors  that  examined  predicted  stock  prices, 
since  stock  indexes  are widely  believed  to follow ran- 
dom  walks. 
6.  Peso Problems 
If an unlikely  event  would  make  a dramatic  impact 
on  predicted  outcomes,  that  event’s  likelihood  can 
affect  optimal  forecasts,  even  if the  event  did not  oc- 
cur  during  a  particular  intervallO.  In  effect,  the 
forecast  contains  a risk premium  for the  unlikely  yet 
dramatic  event.  For  example,  if Russian  investors  in 
1916  assigned  a positive  probability  to  a Bolshevik 
Revolution,  stock  prices  of  Russian  firms  in  1916 
might  appear  lower  than  could  be  explained  by  ob- 
servable  factors  such  as earnings,  dividends,  and  in- 
terest  rates.  In  hindsight,  such  a  forecast  appears 
eminently  rational.  Krasker  [1980]  has  noted  that 
such  peso  problems  can  invalidate  usual  tests  of 
efficiency  in  the  foreign  exchange  market. 
In studying  macroeconomic  forecasts,  a particularly 
important  event  to  consider  is  the  possibility  of  a 
major  policy  regime  change.  The  acknowledged 
possibility  of  a  regime  change  could  account  for 
statistical  bias over  almost  any  specific  interval.  For 
example,  downward-biased  forecasts  of inflation  could 
be due  to a positive  probability  placed  on the  Federal 
Reserve’s  adopting  a monetary  policy  emphasizing 
price  stability.  Even  if such  a policy  were  not  adopted 
during  a particular  time  period,  a forecaster’s  subjec- 
tive  probability  of such  a policy  being  adopted  may 
have  been  correct. 
9  Indeed,  even  with  stationary  data that  is highly  autocorrelated, 
Mankiw  and  Shapiro  (19861  have  shown  that  conventional 
F-tests  will  reject  true  models  too  frequently. 
lo  This  is labeled  a peso  problem  due  to  a lengthy  period  when 
the  Mexican  peso  traded  in forward  markets  at a rate  below  the 
fiied  spot  rate,  due  to  the  widespread  belief  that  a devaluation 
of  the  peso  would  eventually  occur. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  7 Although  it is not  possible  to  completely  rule  out 
peso  problems,  it  is  feasible  to  see  whether  plau- 
sible  anticipated  policy  changes  could  account  for 
findings  of statistical  bias.  None  of the  authors  cited 
in  the  introduction  makes  the  attempt. 
7.  Representative Individual’s Utility 
Function 
Zellner  [  19861 has noted  that,  for many  utility func- 
tions,  an individual’s  optimal  forecast  can  be  biased. 
In particular,  by accepting  some  bias it may  be possi- 
ble  to  lower  the  standard  error  of a point  predictor 
and  thereby  lower  the  mean  squared  error  of a series 
of forecasts.  Also,  if the  loss  of utility  from  an over- 
prediction  does  not  precisely  equal  the  loss  of 
utility  from  an  underprediction  of  the  same 
magnitude,  then  an  unbiased  forecast  may  not 
maximize  utility.  Zellner  provides  a  specific 
example  to  illustrate  the  latter  point.  Stockman 
[  19871 derives  a loss function  for forecast  errors  from 
an  agent’s  exact  decision  problem,  finding  that  in 
general  such  loss  functions  will not  value  over-  and 
underpredictions  equally. 
None  of the  studies  cited  in the  introduction  pro- 
vide  evidence  that  a  representative  individual’s 
utility  function  is maximized  by  an unbiased  forecast. 
That  key  point  is  simply  assumed. 
CONCLUSION 
Many  authors  have  tested  for  bias  in  surveys  of 
macroeconomic  expectations  or  time  series  of 
forecasts.  Although  the  authors  believed  they  were 
testing  the  rationality  of expectations,  there  are many 
reasons  why  they  could  have  found  bias.  Seven 
reasons  are  listed  above  that  are  seldom  examined, 
that  are  likely  to  affect  the  results  of  conventional 
tests,  and  that  have  little  relevance  to  important 
economic  questions.  Some  of  the  reasons  are  due 
to  the  reviewer  using  information  that  was  not 
available  to  forecasters.  Others  are  due  to  the 
reviewer  not  using  relevant  information  that  was 
available to forecasters.  Since  any finding  of bias could 
be  due  to  at  least  one  of  the  reasons  given  above, 
the  relevance  of  such  tests  is questionable. 
The  convenient  assumption  of  certainty  equiva- 
lence  can  be  appropriately  tested,  once  careful 
attention  is  given  to  data  available  to  real-time 
forecasters.  The  fundamental  idea  of  informational 
efficiency  is  much  harder  to  test.  It  has  not  been, 
and  almost  certainly  cannot  be,  properly  examined 
by  simple  tests  for  biased  expectations  or forecasts. 
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